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Reply to Daniel Polsby
SAMUEL R. GROSSt

I'd like to offer a few words in response to Professor Polsby's
articulate, forceful and amusing essay in favor of capital
punishment.
Professor Polsby is right. The central utilitarian question
about the death penalty is not whether it alters the pre-crime
calculus of a would-be murderer. That is implausible, and perhaps
beside the point. James Fitzjames Stephen put the issue of deterrence in its proper perspective over a hundred years ago:
"Some men probably abstain from murder because they fear that if they
committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain
from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged." 1

Professor Polsby proposes an even broader test:
"The ultimate test of the death penalty is whether it enhances the legal
system's reputation for dispensing justice."2

Seen from this perspective, a reduction in the murder rate would

be an indicator of the value of capital punishment, but not the
only indicator. We could also look to reductions in the incidence of
other crimes, or to other measures of social order and judicial well
being.
"Ultimate test" may be an overstatement, but I'm willing to
grant the argument. But there's a problem. The syllogism for
which Professor Polsby is reaching is something like this:
A sanction that enhances the legal system's reputation for
justice is valuable.
MAJOR PREMI E:

MINOR PREMISE: The death penalty enhances the legal system's reputation

for justice.
CONCLUSION:

The death penalty is a valuable sanction.

Even granting the major premise, the conclusion only follows
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1968, Columbia College; J.D. 1973,
University of California, Berkeley.
1. JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF CRMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND (1883).
2. Daniel D. Polsby, Recontextualizing the Context of the Death Penalty, 44 BUFF. L.

Rav. 527, 529 (1996).
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if the minor premise is true-and for that, there is no evidence.
The basic problem with utilitarian arguments for the death
penalty-and perhaps the root reason why so few academics make
them-is that we now know we can do just fine without it. The
modern western world presents us with a continuing social experiment: Is there any evidence that "the legal system's reputation for
dispensing justice" is better in Illinois, where Professor Polsby enjoys the benefits of a death penalty, than in Michigan, where I live
happily without one? Perhaps you don't believe in inter-state comparisons within a nation; but where is the evidence that Great
Britain suffers from the absence of the death penalty, by comparison to the United States? Did respect for the law drop in Canada
when capital punishment was abolished in 1967? Or, to get closer
to home, does anyone seriously believe that respect for law will
soar in New York now that it's been restored? Professor Polsby of
course, is no fool. He recognizes that there is no specific evidence
of the value of capital punishment, but argues by analogy that this
is not fatal. After all, its also hard to assess the contribution of a
single kidney to a person's well being: If the remaining one is
healthy we can lose one kidney with no ill effects. Given our experience with the death penalty, I think a different metaphor is
closer to the mark: If an organ is removed from one person after
another and no one seems to suffer, shouldn't we conclude that it's
really a vestigial appendage?
Professor Polsby disputes my argument that "death is different," but I think he misunderstands it. My point is not that capital
punishment is different but that death is different-in particular,
that homicide prosecutions are different from other criminal prosecutions. Adding the death penalty to the equation no doubt makes
the problem worse, but many of the sources of error that I identify
are common among non-capital homicide cases, and also occur in a
small fraction of non-homicide prosecutions.
My main claim is that erroneous convictions are more common
in capital cases than in run-of-the-mill felony prosecutions. Professor Polsby's response to my argument is simply to reject it. Contrary to his assertion, however, I don't "assume" that homicides
and capital cases are particularly error prone; I point out that the
available data strongly suggests that conclusion, and I explore the
special problems that make it plausible. But Professor Polsby's rejection is not the usual Pollyannish variety: "We almost never
make mistakes, and certainly not when someone's life is at stake!"
Instead he is the cynic: Errors and uncertainties are endemic, the
police are corrupt, and capital cases are no worse than the rest. It's
hard to see this as a defense of our system of prosecuting homicides and executing prisoners, if that's how it is intended.
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In my own defense, I will point out that I didn't cut this argument from whole cloth. At the beginning of this project I asked a
retired police officer, with twenty years experience as a patrolman
and detective, if he thought homicide investigations were more error prone than other criminal cases. He said, "of course"-and
gave some of the reasons I've attempted to explore. When I was
finishing this paper, I asked the same question to a former prosecutor with a dozen or more years experience, and he said the same
thing: "Absolutely. Of course." Why does Professor Polsby disagree? The reason, I think, is that, cynic though he be, Professor
Polsby sees criminal justice in idealized terms. In reality, the big
problem with the police is not dishonesty or even incompetence,
but over extension. Sure, cops will occasionally "frame a guilty
man" on a drug bust. But in general, if it's not a homicide they're
not likely to have the time or interest to do enough work to get far
enough into a hard case to make a serious mistake.
Professor Polsby does recognize that errors in capital cases are
inevitable. But what about the consequences that follow? Three
points:
First, Professor Polsby attributes to me the sentiment that a
single wrongful execution is worse than many cases of wrongful imprisonment for life. I do not believe that. I do think that it is worse
to kill in error than to imprison in error, even for life-but who
doesn't? Beyond that obvious point, I have no conviction. I do not
think it's a balance that can be struck, since I see no moral basis
by which to compare destroying one life by one means and destroying other lives by another means. I do believe that one of the
most serious problems of our current system of homicide prosecutions is that quite a few defendants are erroneously sentenced to
prison for life, and their convictions go largely unexamined. Those
are probably the most common errors in capital prosecutions, and
(as I argue) I believe their frequency is increased by the availability of the death penalty.
Second, Professor Polsby argues that we need not too much
procedure, not too little procedure, but just the right amount of
procedure. I don't want to pick an argument with Goldilocks, but
what does this mean? Is Professor Polsby really saying that we
have, somehow, arrived at just the right balance? In the context of
his argument, this is a brave claim: The police are shoddy and dishonest, the judicial process is unreliable, errors are endemic-but
Not To Worry. The patchwork of procedure stitched together by
the courts, the legislatures and our chief executives is just the right
response to this depressing state, taking into account all relevant
considerations.
Third, Professor Polsby recognizes-with commendable hon-
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esty-that inevitably, we will come to know that an execution, or
several, were carried out in error. He worries about how this tragedy will be perceived: will the public be able to set aside the
"childish notion of perfectibility of governmental functions like the
dispensing of justice" and support the process as it really is? But
wait: haven't we lost the thread? Didn't Professor Polsby just tell
us that the key to the value of the death penalty is its ability to
"enhance the legal system's reputation for dispensing justice"?
When it's shown that a citizen who was convicted, condemned and
killed by the state was in fact innocent-what will that do to "the
sovereign's reputation for dispensing justice"?

